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PERSPECTIVES ON THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF LEGAL PROCEDURES IN 
THE UNITED STATESt 
John H. Jackson* 
The question of how to implement worthy governmental policies is al-
ways important - and often neglected. Much attention goes toward the 
study and formulation of policies, but frequently the question of imple-
menting the policy is relatively ignored or left to "technicians." Yet in con-
nection with many subjects, certainly including international trade, major 
difficulties and perplexities are encountered in carrying out a policy. An 
important dimension of international economic policy consists of the legal 
processes, both international and national, that are connected with imple-
menting those policies. 1 
Both in the United States and abroad the U.S. legal system has been 
strongly criticized for its handling of international trade regulation.2 Some 
of this criticism parallels general statements made about the United States 
as a litigious society, with too many lawyers and too much attention to "le-
galism." Despite their serious data faults and some serious misconceptions 
about comparing the role of a lawyer in the United States to false counter-
parts in other countries, I feel that it is worthwhile to examine these criti-
cisms more systematically. 
It is said, for example, that the U.S. legalistic system of regulating trade 
is costly, is itself a "non-tariff barrier" to trade, and lends itself to manipu-
lative use by special domestic interests. Some of this may be true, but a 
systematic appraisal must examine at least three questions: (I) What are 
the real costs of the system? (2) What are the benefits of the system? and (3) 
What alternatives to the system exist or are feasible, and what are their 
costs and benefits? 
In this brief article I will confine myself to an analysis of the U.S. legal 
system pertaining to regulation of imports, deferring to other works an ex-
t A preliminary and summary version of this article was presented by invitation at a panel 
chaired by Professor Robert Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin, at the annual meeting of 
the American Economic Association in San Francisco, December 27, 1983. 
* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, and former General Counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Office 
of the President of the United States. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D. 1959, University of 
Michigan. - Ed. 
1. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969) (hereinafter 
cited as J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]; J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1977) (hereinafter cited as J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS]. 
2. See Green, The New Protectionism, 3 NW. J. INTL. L. Bus. 1 (1981); ADVISORY COUNCIL 
ON JAPAN-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS, JAPAN·U.S. BUSINESSMEN'S CONFERENCE, AGENDA 
FOR ACTION 35-39 (July 1983). 
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ploration of similar questions relating to regulation of exports or other in-
ternational economic activities. First, however, I wish to touch on policies 
related to the legal structure of international rules for trade. This will help 
put the subject of this article in broader perspective, and although I will 
focus on U.S. domestic law measures, it will readily be seen that the inter-
national system depends greatly on national legal systems for its efficacy, 
and that to a lesser extent the national legal system likewise depends on the 
international system. Most policies of each category of system can apply 
almost equally in the other category. That is, many of the reasons for a 
"rule-oriented" approach in the international legal system also apply to a 
national system, and vice versa. The following sections discuss separately 
the three questions mentioned above, along with some policy and historical 
matters, in the context of U.S. import regulation. 
I. RULE ORIENTATION VERSUS POWER ORIENTATION FOR THE 
PROCEDURES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
I have written elsewhere about the distinction between "power-ori-
ented" and "rule-oriented" diplomacy.3 Roughly categorizing diplomatic 
techniques into these two groups is an oversimplification, of course, but it is 
a useful one in describing a certain difference in technique and spirit that is 
involved in international discourse. Particularly when it comes to interna-
tional affairs, these distinctions can have considerable importance. 
Power-oriented techniques suggest a diplomat asserting, subtly or other-
wise, the power of the nation he or she represents. Often diplomats of the 
more powerful nations prefer negotiation as a method of settling matters 
because they can bring to bear that power to win advantage in the particu-
lar negotiation. The "bargaining chips" involved could be promised aid, 
trade concessions, movement of an aircraft carrier, influence on exchange 
rates, and the like. 
A rule-oriented approach, by way of contrast, would be designed to help 
institutions which would insure the highest possible degree of adherence 
and conformity to a set of rules. The rules themselves would be formulated 
in advance and would presumably make broad policy sense for the benefit 
of the world and the parties concerned. Of course, the process of formulat-
ing the rules will involve, to a certain extent, power-oriented techniques. 
In negotiations for the settlement of disputes between countries, both 
techniques will be used in varying degrees. If a power orientation prevails, 
however, the dispute is likely to be settled more from the point of view of 
which party has the greater power. By contrast, if a rule-oriented approach 
prevails, the negotiation would resolve the dispute by reference to what the 
participants expect an international body would conclude about the appli-
cation of preexisting international obligations. 
Although to a large extent all government activity involves a mixture of 
these two techniques, and indeed to a large degree the history of civilization 
may be described as a gradual evolution from a power-oriented approach 
towards a rule-oriented approach, nevertheless the present state of interna-
3. See, e.g., Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.W.T.L. 
93, 98 (1978). 
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tional affairs tips the scales heavily in favor of the power orientation. Yet a 
strong argument can be made that the same evolution must occur in inter-
national affairs and that, as to international economic affairs particularly, 
there are strong arguments for pursuing evenhandedly, and with a fixed 
direction, progress in international procedures towards a rule-oriented ap-
proach. Several advantages accrue generally to international affairs through 
a rule-oriented approach, such as: (I) less reliance on raw power and the 
temptation to exercise it; (2) fairer treatment of the smaller countries, or at 
least a perception of greater fairness; and (3) the development of agreed 
procedures to achieve the necessary compromises. In economic affairs there 
are additional reasons for a rule-oriented approach. 
Economic affairs tend (at least in peace time) to affect more citizens 
directly than do political and military affairs. As the world becomes more 
economically interdependent, private citizens increasingly find their jobs, 
their businesses, and their quality of life affected, if not controlled, by forces 
from outside their country's boundaries. Thus, they are more affected by 
the international economic negotiations pursued by their own country on 
their behalf. A rule-oriented approach allows citizens a greater opportunity 
to give their "input" into the processes, and also allows decentralized deci-
sion makers (such as entrepreneurs in market-oriented economies) a greater 
opportunity to plan and to base action on more predictable and stable gov-
ernmental policies. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SYSTEM OF 
REGULATING IMPORTS 
Most Americans are familiar with the history and essential structure of 
the U.S. Constitution.4 The founders were suspicious of power, and framed 
the Constitution with a series of "checks and balances" to attempt to pre-
vent concentration of power. In foreign affairs at least, as well as in other 
subjects, this arrangement has resulted in constant tension between the 
President (including his "Executive Branch" officials and agencies) and the 
Congress. 
Although the U.S. Constitution in the foreign affairs area is often am-
biguous with respect to the division of powers between the President and 
the Congress, the Constitution is much more explicit with regard to interna-
tional economic affairs. Article 1, section 8, explicitly delegates to the Con-
gress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations," and "to lay 
and collect ... duties .... " The Congress jealously guards this power 
and likes to remind the President of this constitutional clause. Thus, mat-
ters such as import duties and other regulations of imports can be claimed 
by the Congress to be exclusively within its power. That is, the President 
has no "inherent" or other authority over the subject unless Congress has 
delegated such authority to him by statute. 
With respect to import duties, the Congress exercised this authority it-
self through the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.5 The results 
4. For an overview of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. regulation ofintemational economic 
affairs, see generally J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 27S-78. 
5. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677 (1982). 
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of that exercise, however, left many observers with the realization that the 
Congress was not able to act on imports for the benefit of the general public 
interest. Thus, early in the Roosevelt presidency, the Congress was per-
suaded by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to enact the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934,6 under which the Congress delegated to the Presi-
dent the authority to enter into international tariff-reducing and trade-regu-
lating agreements, and to implement those agreements in U.S. law without 
further reference to Congress. This act originally expired after three years, 
but it has been renewed from time to time and continues to be an essential 
element of the U.S. government's system for regulating imports. One of the 
renewals was in 1945, for a three-year period, during which the GATT -
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - was negotiated under its au-
thority. Other subsequent renewals include the 1962 Trade Expansion 
Act,7 and the 1974 Trade Act.8 The authority of the 1974 Trade Act ex-
pired in January of 1980, however, and since that time there has been no 
renewal of any general delegation of tariff-cutting authority to the Presi-
dent, although much other detailed delegation remains. 
During the post-World War II period, there have been two parallel but 
clear trends in the system of U.S. regulation of imports. The first trend has 
been the dramatic overall reduction in the level of tariffs since 1947, after 
the negotiation of the GA TT, and the holding of seven tariff and trade ne-
gotiating rounds (through 1979) under the auspices of GATT.9 
The second trend has been a gradually accelerating recourse to nontariff 
measures for restraining imports, including measures entitled "antidumping 
duties" and "countervailing duties." This trend has accelerated particularly 
since 1962, and it is instructive to examine the major trade acts of 1962, 
1974, and 1979 (the last being the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which 
implemented the results of the Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions10). The clear trend manifested in those statutes is toward a greater 
"legalization" or ']udicialization" of the system. The 1974 act greatly re-
duced administrative discretion in the application of certain regulatory 
principles, particularly countervailing duties. It did this by imposing time 
limits on administrative action and, in some cases, by embellishing the re-
quirements for public hearings and other procedures to allow citizen access 
to the process. The 1979 act went even further in this regard, and also took 
6. Trade Agreement Act§§ 1-4, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1982). 
7. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1982). 
8. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. V 1975) (expired 1980) (current ver-
sion at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982) (amended 1983)). 
9. W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T. KRONSJO, & T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 
TOKYO ROUND: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 9 (1978); K. KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
POLICY AND THE GATT 1947-1967, 276-77 (1969); See Jackson, The Birth of the GA'IT-MTN 
System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 21, 24 (1980). 
10. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101-07 (Countervailing and An-
tidumping Duties) and§§ 1001-02 (Judicial Review in Countervailing Duty and Antidumping 
Duty Proceedings), 93 Stat. 144, 150-93, 300-07 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77g and 
in other scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1982) (amended 1983)); Trade Act of 
1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975) (expired 1980) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 
(1982) (amended 1983)); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1982). 
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some major steps in expanding the scope of judicial review of administra-
tive actions. 
Consequently, as of mid-1984, the United States has a remarkably elab-
orate governmental system for the regulation of imports, including approxi-
mately a dozen different types of procedures or processes, most of which 
include a number of explicit statutory procedural requirements calling for: 
(1) citizen complaint initiation; (2) public hearings; (3) published official 
determinations with reasoned opinions; (4) judicial review; and/or (5) 
much reduced discretion for Executive Branch officials handling these mat-
ters. Appendix A to this article enumerates many of these different proce-
dures, with a short paragraph describing each. This may assist those who 
are not familiar with the U.S. import regulation system to perceive its over-
all scope. 
Ill. THE POLICY GOALS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND 
PROCEDURES FOR REGULATING IMPORTS 
The details of substantive policy goals for U.S. import policy are beyond 
the scope of this paper, which will instead focus on procedures. However, 
the first obvious policy goal of any system is to arrive in specific cases at the 
"right decision." What is the right decision in cases of import regulation is 
almost never easy to ascertain. Perhaps it is to permit the greatest liberality 
for imports coming into the United States that can be accomplished without 
causing undue harm to the U.S. economy, without being too unjust to par-
ticular segments of the U.S. economy, and without upsetting important in-
ternational relations of the United States with foreign countries. As so 
stated, this is virtually a shibboleth. However, specific cases are very com-
plex and they often pose dilemmas between contradictory goals, such as 
between the goals of permitting maximum imports yet preventing unfair 
hardship on particular small segments of the U.S. economy. It is difficult to 
know and to decide what is right in each case, but that is the essence of 
government. 
Having given due obeisance to substantive policy, most of the remaining 
policies that I will mention could be categorized as "procedural." These are 
the policies that underlie the way that institutions and procedures have 
been shaped within the United States. Unfortunately, many of these poli-
cies are overlooked by important critics of the system. Perhaps it will be 
easiest for the reader if I enumerate them briefly: 
(1) The procedure should maximize the opportunity of government offi-
cials to receive all relevant information, arguments, and perspectives. Thus, 
a procedure that allows all interested parties to present evidence and argu-
ments would enhance the realization of this goal. 
(2) The procedure should prevent corruption and ethical ma/a fldes, 
even when the latter fall short of corruption and illegal activity. Another 
way to express this is that an important policy goal of the procedure is to 
prevent "back room political deals" that favor special or particular interests 
while defeating broader policy objectives of the U.S. government. 
(3) The procedure should enhance the perception of all parties who will 
be affected by a decision that they have had their chance to present infor-
mation and arguments, i.e., that they have had their "day in court." This is 
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an important policy objective, particularly for democratic societies; affected 
parties must have some confidence in the decision-making process, even 
when the decision goes against them. 
(4) The procedure should be perceived by the citizens at large as fair 
and tending to maximize the chances for a correct decision. A sense of 
fairness will include a desire that even weaker interests in a society be 
treated fairly, i.e., that the ability to get a favorable decision will not depend 
only on money, political power, status, or other elements deemed unfair. 
(5) The procedure should be reasonably efficient, that is, it should allow 
reasonably quick government decisions and minimize the cost both to gov-
ernment and to private parties of arriving at those decisions. It is this policy 
goal that is most questioned by the criticisms of the American "legalistic" 
procedures. 
(6) The procedure should tend to maximize the likelihood that a deci-
sion will be made on a general national basis (or international basis), not 
catering particularly to special interests. In other words, the procedure 
should be designed so that government officials can realistically be assisted 
in "fending off'' special interests that conflict with the general good of the 
nation. 
(7) The procedure must fit into the overall constitutional system of the 
society concerned and be consistent with policy goals underpinning that 
constitutional system. For the United States, as stated above, an important 
policy underpinning the Constitution is the prevention of power monopo-
lies within our society. The system of checks and balances thus creates a 
constant tension between various branches of the government, which may 
often appear messy, costly, and inefficient, but which is based on funda-
mental constitutio~al principles. 
(8) Predictability and stability of decisions are important values. Pre-
dictability of decisions, whether based on precedent, statutory formulas, or 
something else, enables priv~te parties and their counselors (lawyers, econ-
omists, and politicians) to calculate generally the potential or lack of poten-
tial for a favorable decision under each of a variety of different regulatory 
schemes. The greater the predictability, the more likely that cases will be 
brought only if they have a good chance to succeed. The private lawyer 
often experiences the situation wherein he counsels clients in the privacy of 
his office in such a way that the client will use her best judgment to decide 
not to bring a case. 
I make no claim that the list of policy objectives enumerated above is 
exhaustive; I am certain that others can be considered. Likewise, as stated 
earlier, the policy goals mentioned tend to be related to national procedures 
rather than to international procedures. However, many of these goals also 
apply, sometimes with modified weight, to international institutions and 
procedures. 
IV. COSTS OF THE U.S. SYSTEM - QUANTIFIABLE AND 
NON-QUANTIFIABLE 
I want to turn now to an attempt to appraise the costs to U.S. society of 
the U.S. government system of regulating imports. Again, I am only look-
ing at the import side ( export regulations could be taken up separately). 
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Furthermore, I am attempting to evaluate the costs of the "legalistic sys-
tem." There are certain costs that would be incurred no matter what type of 
import regulation system a government operated, whether it was a system 
of broad government discretion or a more legalistic system with hearings, 
statutory criteria, and judicial review. 
The costs can be roughly divided into two types: those that are quantifi-
able, and those that are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. I will take 
up each of these types in turn. 
I should also note that the concept of "legalistic" is relative. Even in the 
U.S. import regulation system, often deemed the most "legalistic" in the 
world, there are many possibilities for flexibility, executive discretion, and 
(less fortunately) "deal making." 
A. Quant!ftable Costs of the U.S. Import Regulation System 
As a rather simplistic exercise, I have tried to evaluate the quantifiable 
costs in dollars of the U.S. method of regulating imports. A careful evalua-
tion would involve a rather elaborate survey research study, and I have not 
so far had the resources to undertake that. Furthermore, I am not certain 
that such a study would be likely to produce results that are meaningfully 
better than my "rough and dirty" techniques. 11 
The quantifiable costs can be divided into three categories: (1) the bud-
getary costs of the U.S. government agencies concerned; (2) the costs of 
private attorneys and external consultants who handle such cases; and (3) 
the in-house costs of the firms that are engaged in such cases. There may be 
a few other costs that do not easily fall into these three categories, but they 
are likely to be very small. In evaluating these quantifiable costs I have 
attempted to exclude, to the extent feasible, the governmental and other 
costs that would be incurred regardless of the type of regulatory system 
involved. Thus, I exclude the governmental costs of the Customs Bureau, 
on the ground that the operation of a general tariff and customs system for 
imports is virtually universal among governments and does not depend on 
the type of import regulation. One can, of course, challenge this assump-
tion since there are clearly some minor aspects of the Customs Bureau oper-
ations that relate to the "legalistic" regulation of imports. Nevertheless, this 
seems to be a plausible rough dividing line for the purposes of this article. 
I. Governmental Costs 
Governmental costs are probably the easiest to identify. One simply 
takes the annual budgetary costs for the agencies involved in the regulation 
of imports and adds them together. Needless to say, some of the agencies 
11. The available data for this simplistic exercise are limited, although a much more exten• 
sive project could probably refine them somewhat. In general I have tried to overstate rather 
than understate the costs. However, even when data is available, there are dozens of different 
ways to "array" or present the data, and I am sure many disputes can be generated by these 
techniques. My goal here is not to develop precise quantities, but to make "order of magni-
tude" guesses, to help point in the direction of policy conclusions. If nothing else, this exercise 
may suggest that the important considerations are not quantifiable. Nevertheless, I hope this 
article might stimulate some other scholar to undertake a more careful appraisal of the costs 
examined here. 
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are involved in both exports and imports, as well as some other interna-
tional economic activities, and to be precise one should disaggregate the 
activities within an agency. I have found this too difficult, so I have simply 
included the total budget amount for the several agencies or agency parts 
that are most concerned with imports, recognizing that my figure in the end 
will likely be an overstatement of costs. 12 The agencies or parts thereof 
included were the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the import regu-
lation portion of the International Trade Administration (Commerce De-
partment), the State Department Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 
and the International Trade Commission. The total costs estimated for 
these agencies is approximately $44 million per year. 
It is possible on the one hand to try to identify a few positions in a 
number of other agencies, such as Treasury, Labor, Defense, Agriculture, 
and a few congressional staff positions, which are concerned with the im-
port processes of the United States, but on the other hand the inclusion of 
the entire agencies discussed in the preceding paragraph would certainly 
include people who are engaged in activities other than imports. The latter 
more than offset the costs in other parts of government, and if anything the 
total above will overstate the total U.S. regulatory costs for imports. 
2. Identifiable Attorney and Consultant Costs 
It is much more difficult to identify and evaluate the nongovernmental 
costs of the system. Indeed, the figures in this subsection and the next sub-
section are little more than guesses, although they are educated guesses. 
For attorneys' fees, I have had the benefit of confidential information from 
attorney friends who deal in these subjects daily, which has given me some 
sort of idea of the costs of the various different kinds of trade procedures. 
When these costs are multiplied by the number of such procedures that are 
brought in any given year and modified by the number of cases that go on 
to later procedural steps including judicial review, one can begin to develop 
a sense of the order of magnitude of the figures that are involved. The types 
of regulatory processes are numerous, 13 but essentially only five of these (as 
outlined in Appendix A) have a significant number of annual proceedings 
and also can be described as part of the "legalistic" trade system. 
Using this technique, I have been able to establish that a reasonable 
(somewhat overstated) estimate of costs for all attorneys' fees for normal 
trade import actions during 1983 is likely to be about $97 million. There is 
one important caveat to this: certain major cases tend to have considerably 
higher costs. For example, the 1982 countervailing duty cases concerning 
carbon steel imports probably involved attorneys' fees approaching the to-
tal attorneys' fees estimated for all countervailing duty cases in one normal 
year. 14 In other words, there is a bulge in the statistics. Likewise, the Ca-
nadian lumber countervailing duty case involved significant attorneys' fees 
that would be above the average because of the enormous amount of trade 
12. See Appendix B. 
13. See Appendix A. 
14. The final determination in the carbon steel countervailing duty cases is published in 47 
Fed. Reg. 39,304 (1982). 
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covered ($2 billion) and the complexity of the case. 15 However, even with 
these payments in mind, it still seems fair to evaluate the rough average 
annual current costs for attorneys and private consultants engaged in vari-
ous import trade actions of the United States at about the amount stated. 
This includes the representation for both importers and domestic industry, 
and would include, where relevant, the costs of representation when they 
are incurred by foreign governments. 
3. Costs Internal to the Firms Involved in the Proceedings 
I have no sound basis for estimating this figure. It has been suggested to 
me, however, and I have accepted for present purposes, that the internal 
firm costs (executives' time, in-house lawyers, clerical time in marshalling 
evidence and data, etc.) are roughly the same as the external firm and con-
sultant costs. 
4. Combining the Various Figures 
One can easily see that the figures under the three parts above would 
total approximately $238 million for 1983. To give due allowance to the 
imprecision of the estimates, we can expand that figure and say that the 
probability is very high that the total is less than $250 million. 
With what can we compare this figure? One obvious comparison is the 
total value of imports during the year, which for 1983 is estimated to be 
$254 billion. The result is that the cost of the U.S. import regulation system 
is 0.0009, or approximately I/10th of I percent of the total annual value of 
imports. One could conclude that this figure is reasonably insignificant, if it 
were considered as a sort of "transaction cost" for a regulatory system that 
had other benefits. It is perhaps not entirely fair, however, to measure or 
evaluate the cost of the system by dividing those quantifiable costs by the 
total value of imports. A better cost-benefit approach would be to look at 
the regulatory system's welfare benefit to society, and I return to that ques-
tion in the next section of this article. It should also be recognized that this 
aggregate approach does not answer all relevant questions. For example, 
the distribution of costs can vary enormously, and may in fact be very un-
fair (imposing, for example, substantial burdens on certain sectors of the 
economy, and few burdens on other sectors). Finally, we must remember 
that there are a number of nonquantifiable costs that need to be weighed in 
the balance. 
B. Nonqua/it!ftable Costs of the Import Regulatory System 
To focus only on the quantifiable dollar costs of the system would be a 
major mistake. Some of the most important costs may in fact be non-quan-
tifiable. A few of these should be mentioned. 
I. Foreign Policy Rigidity 
A system that depends on statutory criteria and procedures, allows citi-
zen access, and establishes predictability, will inherently diminish the dis-
15. The final determination of the Canadian lumber case is at 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983). 
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cretion and flexibility of government officials. Indeed, that is exactly what 
it is designed to do. However, certain types of foreign policy activities may 
be inhibited by such a system. Secret negotiations are much more difficult 
and quick decisions are sometimes almost impossible under a "legalistic" 
system. Indeed, as was demonstrated in the recent countervailing duty case 
concerning Chinese textiles, as well as in certain portions of the 1982 car-
bon steel countervailing duty cases, a "legalistic system" tends to give citi-
zen complainants a considerable amount of control over their cases, which 
in tum risks giving those particular citizens undue advantage to the detri-
ment of broader U.S. foreign policy considerations.16 
2. Manipulation or Harassment 
The legalistic type of system that exists in the United States also lends 
itself to some abuse by special interests that manipulate the system for their 
own advantage in ways not necessarily contemplated by the Congress when 
it enacted the relevant statutes. For example, a complainant may be 
tempted to initiate a proceeding knowing that the procedure will present 
considerable opportunity to create mischief and difficulty for U.S. foreign 
policy while the real motive for using the procedure is to negotiate with the 
government towards some solution that is not contemplated within the stat-
utory or regulatory procedure set up by Congress. A complainant may 
really desire certain tax benefits or cartel-like quotas dividing up the U.S. 
market and ensuring domestic interests of a certain portion of that market. 
It may bring a trade proceeding that contemplates relief through imposition 
of a certain amount of tariff-like duties at the border solely to try to get the 
U.S. government to negotiate in a way that would achieve the complain-
ant's true objective of quota-like restraints. In addition, it has been alleged 
in some commentary and by some foreign observers that the U.S. system 
tends to result in "multiple harassment," by which domestic industry com-
plainants can bring one procedure after another even though they know 
that they probably will not succeed in such procedures. The running battle 
of domestic television interests against imported television sets is often cited 
as one instance of multiple harassment. The mere institution of such proce-
dures creates considerable uncertainty in the market for the imports and 
creates costs for the importing firms concerned. Both factors tend to reduce 
the importation of such challenged goods initially and to increase import-
ers' general costs of penetrating the U.S. market, with attendant effects 
upon their later price structure and competitiveness in the U.S. market. Al-
though appraisal of the "multiple harassment" charge is not easy, there ap-
pear to be few instances in which it can actually be established that such 
action has occurred.17 Even the threat of such activity, however, may itself 
16. Lawrence, Chinese Textile Case Rocks Global Trade Scene, J. of Com., Dec. 22, 1983, 
at 4A; Pine, ll.S. .Delays .Decision on Penalty .Duties on Chinese Textile Imports Until .Dec. 16, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1983, at 8. 
17. Several colleagues and I recently examined trade cases in four or five different legal 
procedures of the United States going back several decades to search for instances in which a 
U.S. industry had complained under more than one of those laws against the same foreign 
producer or importer within a span of five years. We discovered approximately 20 such cases. 
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be somewhat inhibiting to foreign exporters who are eyeing the potential of 
the U.S. market. 
3. Wrong Law Rigidity 
One of the results of the U.S. "legalistic" system of regulating imports is 
that criteria tend to be embodied in statutes enacted by Congress and then 
become very hard to change. Because Congress distrusts executive discre-
tion, it tends to establish rather elaborate detail in statutory criteria. But on 
some occasions the statutory formulas prove later to be inappropriate from 
a policy or economic point of view. 18 Or an international proceeding will 
find that the U.S. law violates U.S. international obligations. 19 In these 
cases it has proved very difficult to get the Congress to change the law, 
because a variety of special interests tend to be able to block such change. 
Consequently, the result is that the system has a certain amount of "wrong 
law rigidity" built into it. 
4. Special Interest I'!fluence on the Formulation of the Statutory Criteria 
The processes by which the Congress writes the statutory criteria and 
formulates the law are reasonably well known. The system sometimes 
lends itself to manipulation by special economic interests in the United 
States that can foresee the results of certain statutory wordings on their po-
tential cases in the future. Thus, an important economic sector can some-
times influence the Congress in developing criteria that will later prove to 
be very beneficial to it in particular cases, even though such criteria may not 
be in the overall best interests of the United States. In this respect, how-
ever, the process is no different from that of any domestic subject matter. It 
is perhaps a price one pays for an open democratic system. 
5. Big Cases Mishandled 
One of the allegations often made is that the United States' elaborately 
legalistic system of import regulation may operate with reasonable satisfac-
tion only as to the little cases that are generally unimportant in themselves. 
But when it comes to very big cases that have a broad influence in major 
sectors of the economy (such as autos, textiles, agriculture, and steel),20 it is 
18. For example, some of the intricate criteria of finding foreign "subsidies" for purposes 
of the countervailing duty law can, with the advantage of hindsight, be considered inappropri-
ate in terms of economic and other policies. Yet it is thought to be virtually impossible to get 
Congress to change the law. 
19. The famous "DISC" case (Domestic International Sales Corporation), in which there 
is a GATI finding that the U.S. law contravenes U.S. international obligations, is one exam-
ple. U.S. administrations have announced that they will try to get Congress to change the law, 
but the statute remains unchanged. For a discussion of the DISC case, see Jackson, The Juris-
prudence of International Trade: The J)ISC case in GAJT, 12 AM, J. INTL. L. 747 (1978). 
20. The escape clause action against importation of automobiles resulted in a negative 
determination by the ITC. Nevertheless, political forces were such as to induce the United 
States to encourage the government of Japan voluntarily to restrain exports of automobiles to 
the United States. The carbon steel countervailing duty cases in 1982 resulted in a settlement 
agreement which, although heavily influenced by the legal procedures, nevertheless was not, at 
least explicitly, contemplated by those procedures. The autumn 1983 complaint against Chi-
nese textile imports into the United States resulted in a withdrawal of the complaint at the last 
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said that the system breaks down and in fact returns, by one subterfuge or 
another, to a "non-rule system" of extensive executive discretion and 
"back-room bargaining." 
6. The .Dilemma of a Legalistic System 
As one can begin to surmise from analyzing these various costs, both 
quantifiable and nonquantifiable, there is to a certain extent a dilemma in-
volved in designing any institutional system for regulating imports. The 
dilemma is not unique to this subject and is involved in a number of other 
areas of governmental endeavor also. This dilemma is that the more one 
maximizes the goals of a legalistic system (predictability, transparency and 
elimination of corruption and political back-room deals), the more one sac-
rifices other desirable goals such as flexibility and the ability of government 
officials to make determinations in the broad national interest as opposed to 
catering to specific special interests. 
V. THE BENEFITS OF THE SYSTEM 
The benefits of the legalistic system may be considerable, but they are 
perhaps harder to appraise. I will discuss them under two categories. 
A. Procedural Benefits of the System 
Apart from costs and delays, the legalistic system responds well to many 
of the goals and objectives set out in section III above. Clearly, the more 
extensive and detailed are the statutory criteria, the public proceedings, the 
opportunity for judicial review and the like, the more likely that the system 
will be predictable, corruption-proof and devoid of back-room political 
deals. An exception to this might be the "big case" question: If the system 
becomes too rigid, the big cases - those involving considerable political 
power -will tend to make "end runs" around the system, and thus will not 
be channeled by the rules and will perhaps be even more vulnerable to 
flexible executive official discretion than would be the case if the formal 
procedures were less rigid and could better accommodate the big cases. 
B. Substantive Benefits 
One of the critical questions, and perhaps the most critical question, is 
whether this legalistic system, given its costs, in fact provides a substantial 
measure of benefits (benefits that exceed the costs) to the general welfare of 
the United States. Here it is necessary to indulge in some assumptions, and 
to recognize that conclusions are only tentative, in the form of hypotheses 
that need further testing. 
The basic assumption that may be required to justify the legalistic sys-
tem is that it in fact allows a higher degree of liberal trade access for im-
ports into the U.S. economy. This assumption itself is premised on the 
assumption that such trade liberalization provides a benefit to the U.S. 
minute, after negotiations between the U.S. government and the textile industry during which 
the government agreed to certain of the industry's import limitation demands. See note 11 
supra. 
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economy. Most economists believe that trade liberalization does provide 
such a benefit, and my colleagues at the University of Michigan Depart-
ment of Economics, Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, have used their very 
large international trade model to compute some of the welfare benefits of 
liberal trade.21 For example, they conclude that a fifty percent reduction 
across the board in pre-Tokyo Round tariff levels (from an average of about 
eight percent to half that), would result in an additional welfare benefit to 
the U.S. economy of approximately one billion dollars. There is some indi-
cation by them and others that this welfare benefit amount is understated, 
but we can accept it provisionally, for purposes of comparison. 
Ifwe can believe (and although it is essentially a 'judgment call" many 
people do believe it) that the U.S. legalistic system - cumbersome, rigid, 
and costly as it is - in fact provides for an economy more open to imports 
than virtually any other major industrial economy in the world, then we 
could count this as a benefit. But measuring that benefit is obviously very 
difficult. We are measuring it against an unknown - namely, what would 
be the degree of import restraint in the U.S. economy if the U.S. system 
were not so legalistic and were more "discretion prone." Morici and Megna 
of the National Planning Association have tried to evaluate the current 
costs of all the various nontariff barriers in the United States, and they ar-
rived at an amount ofless than one percent tariff equivalent.22 The current 
import restraints, they report, are fairly modest in comparison with those of 
other economies, so one might well imagine that the tariff equivalent of 
import restraints unfettered by a legalistic system might be considerably 
more restrictive. Another way to say it is that overall import restraint tariff 
equivalents could increase by fifty percent over pre-Tokyo Round U.S. 
tariff levels (in the Deardorff-Stern model). Thus the Deardorff-Stern wel-
fare benefit amount of about one billion dollars might be one "ballpark" 
measure of the more quantifiable of the economic benefits of the trade regu-
latory system. This compares quite favorably to the quantifiable costs men-
tioned above (and in Appendix B), although this comparison depends on 
much-hedged assumptions. 
One must not forget, however, that there are also a number of non-
quantifiable benefits to the system - greater confidence of the citizenry in 
the operation of its government in this subject matter, the business planning 
advantage of a higher degree of stability in governmental actions, reduction 
of corruption, etc. 
VI. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PERSPECTIVES 
What I have tried to do in this brief article is to approach the question 
of whether the U.S. legalistic and procedural system of regulating imports, 
despite its considerable costs, has advantages that outweigh those costs. 
This is, to my knowledge, a first attempt to be somewhat concrete and even 
21. Deardorff & Stem, The Structure and Sample Results of the Michigan Computational 
Model of World Production and Trade (Dec. 5, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (for presenta-
tion at the Symposium on General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modelling, Columbia University, 
April 5-6, 1984). 
22. MORICI & MEGNA, U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES AFFECTING INDUSTRIAL TRADE - A 
QUANTITATIVE AsSESSMENT 47 (Natl. Planning Assn. Report No. 200, 1983). 
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quasi-quantifiable in answering this question. Nevertheless, it is very diffi-
cult to be too precise, even as to the quantifiable aspects. One could con-
ceive of a more elaborate research study that might gain greater precision in 
this matter, but one can also doubt that the additional effort of such study 
would really tell us very much. Even indulging in an overestimation of 
quantifiable costs and a possible underestimation of quantifiable benefits, 
one can see that the benefits appear to be very substantial compared to the 
costs. However, the most important part of the subject may indeed be the 
nonquantifiable parts, and on those one is likely to receive many different 
opinions from a variety of knowledgeable observers. In short, the matter 
seems to be very much 'Judgmental." People will bring to that judgment 
their own personal experiences, often involving specific cases, which cases 
may not be generally representative of the system as a whole. 
One thing is clear, however: Those who would criticize the existing sys-
tem must bear the responsibility of weighing that system against viable al-
ternative systems. It is not enough simply to describe in great detail all the 
horrors, or detriments, of the existing system. It is necessary to weigh in the 
balance the advantages of the system and to do that in comparison with 
viable alternative systems. Is there any viable alternative system that is 
likely to be more satisfactory than or even as satisfactory as the existing 
system? What are the possible alternative systems? The principal one that 
comes to mind is one that would involve a considerably higher degree of 
government officials' discretion. We can witness such systems in other ma-
jor industrial countries with considerable imports. Such observation does 
not lead one to be confident about those alternatives to the U.S. system. 
The dangers of corruption are high; the dangers of political manipulation 
and back-room deals are also high; and often the weaker segments of the 
domestic economy (frequently including consumers) are the ones who must 
pay for the resulting decisions that are made for the benefit of the more 
powerful producing interests. The legalistic system permits well-inten-
tioned governmental officials to fend off certain types of particularistic pres-
sures (but, of course, no system will fend off all such pressures). 
Sometimes governmental officials, past, present or future, express con-
siderable impatience with the U.S. legalistic system and yearn for a simpler 
structure. Often they are simply expressing a bias that can frequently be 
perceived in government officials, ~hat whatever system exists should leave 
to those government officials as much discretion and elbow room as possi-
ble to make the necessary decisions because those officials inherently feel 
that they will make the best decisions possible. Others of us may not have 
such a high degree of confidence in government officialdom. 
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APPENDIX A 
MAJOR U.S. IMPORT REGULATIONS 
TYPE STAT AGENCIES TIME CIT PUB. REAS JUD. 
INVOLVED LIM. CMPL HEAR DET. REVIEW 
(!) Escape Clause TA§ 201 ITC/Pres. y y y y N 
(2) Anti-Dumping TAA§I0I ITA/ITC y y y y y 
(3) Countervailing 
ITA/ITC Duties TAA § IOI y y y y y 
(4) Complaints vs. 
Foreign Govt. 
Actions TA §301 STR/Pres. y y y y N 
(5) Unfair Trade TA §341 
Practices (f § 337) ITC/Pres. y y y y y 
(6) Non-market 
economy 
safeguards TA §406 ITC/Pres. y y y y N 
(7) Textile AA§22 Pres. N N y y N 
(8) National 
Security TEA §232 Cmc/Pres. y y Y(ia) y N 
(9) Dairy Prod. AAA§22 Ag/ITC/Pres. N N y y N 
(10) Meat MIA§ I Pres. N N Y(pc) y N 
(11) Tax. Meas. IRC § 103 
(Houdaille) (a)(7)(D) Pres. N N N N N 
(12) GSP TA Tit.V Pres. y N N y N 
(13) Voluntary 
Restraint TEA §352 Pres. y N N N N 
Agreements AA §204 Pres. y N N N N 
(14) Gen. Customs 
(tariffs) T §516 Treas. y y y y y 
Abbreviations: 
T Tar!ff Act of 1930 as amended 
TA Trade Act of 1974 
T AA Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
TEA Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
MIA Meal Import Act of 1979 
ITC International Trade Commission (of U.S.) 
ITA International Trade Admin. (.Dept. of Commerce) 
IRC Internal Revenue Code 
AA Agricultural Act of 1956 
AAA Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
Pres President 
pc public comment 
ia "!/ ii is appropriate" 
Y Yes 
N No 
Ag Agriculture .Department 
Cmc Commerce .Department 
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statutory reference, as amended 
"' agencies that administer 
"' statutory time limits 
complaints citizens can initiate 
public hearings provided in statute or regulation 
reasoned determination must be published 
judicial review provided by statute 
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The first five procedures have been analyzed for costs since they involve legalistic proce-
dures and significant private party initiated proceedings each year. As explained in the text, 
normal customs procedures are omitted. Numbers 6 and 8 have averaged less than one case 
per year. The column headings refer to explicit statutory or regulatory procedures, but there 
are also implicit possibilities (such as constitutional challenges in court) that may occur in 
some cases. 
(I) The Escape Clause: This law (Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982)) pro-
vides that when increasing imports are the substantial cause of serious injury to a competing 
U.S. industry, the President can proclaim certain limitations regarding those imports for a 
temporary period not to exceed five years. 
(2) Anti Dumping: This law (Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677 
(1982)) provides that if imports into the United States are priced at a level that is below the 
price at which those goods are sold in the market of the producer, then the difference (after 
adjusting for a number of different circumstances) can be offset with an additional tariff duty 
at the border of the United States. 
(3) Countervailing Duties (Trade Agreement Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1672, 
1675-1677 (1982)): These duties can be assessed at the border of the United States in addition 
to normal duties to offset any subsidies that the imported goods enjoy. 
(4) Complaints Against Foreign Government Actions: Trade Act of 1974, § 301, as amended 
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982), sets forth a procedure by 
which American firms and citizens can complain to the U.S. government about foreign govern-
ment practices affecting U.S. exports or other trading actions. The United States is obliged to 
study the complaint and, if it finds the complaint meritorious, to undertake negotiations and 
other actions to persuade the foreign government to change its practices. Ultimately it gives 
authority to the President to retaliate by various measures. 
(5) Unfair Trade Practices (Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 
§ 341, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)): This is a very generalized "unfair trade practices" provision, 
by which American companies can complain to the International Trade Commission that im-
ports are involved in unfair trade practices such as patent or copyright infringement, monopo-
lization, etc. If the ITC finds the complaint meritorious, it can order a ban on all imports of 
those goods, subject to a presidential override. 
(6) Non-Market Economy Safeguards Measure (Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 
(1982)): This is an alternative escape clause procedure, with slightly softer criteria for the 
causal link between increased imports and serious injury, designed for imports from 
nonmarket economies. Cases average less than one per year. 
(1) Textile Import Barriers (Agricultural Act of 1956, § 204, as amended by 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1854): The United States, like many other textile importing countries, takes advantage of the 
International Multifiber Agreement in the context of GAIT, Agreement Regarding Interna-
tional Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, to negotiate a series 
of bilateral export restraint arrangements with textile supplying countries. 
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(8) National Security: A U.S. statute (The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232, as 
amended by Trade Act of 1974, § 127, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1862-1863 (1982)) provides that com-
plaints can be made to the U.S. government that imports are harming a U.S. industry to the 
extent that would endanger national security. This requires an investigation of the matter by 
the Co=erce Department and a report to the President. The President is authorized to take 
import restraining measures if he finds them justified for national security purposes. Only 
petroleum products have actually benefitted from import restraint action, although a number 
of other complaints have been made and turned down. (Complaints average less than one per 
year.) 
(9) .Dairy Product Import Restraints (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, § 22, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 624 (1982): Originally§ 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provided for quota-
type restraints on a number of agricultural products. For the most part the quota restraints 
that remain are those involving dairy products such as cheese. 
{IO) Meat Imports (Meat Import Act of 1979, § I, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982)): These can be 
restrained under provisions of agricultural legislation that try to set limits on the imports of 
meat based on projections of domestic supply and demand. 
(11) Tax Measures (Houdaille 41 Fed. Reg. 20411 (1982) (Discussion of complaint)): An 
unusual complaint was brought several years ago by domestic machine tool companies 
against imports from Japan, arguing that the imports have been favored with various unfair 
Japanese government practices, including subsidies, and that therefore under the Internal 
Revenue Act of 1971, § 103, 26 U.S.C. § 48 (a)(7)(D) (1982), certain tax advantages to U.S. 
companies for purchasing such imported machines should be denied. The complaint was 
turned down. 
(12) Generalized System of Preferences: Under Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2461-2465 (1982), many goods from most developing countries can be imported tariff-free 
into the United States. The list of goods, as well as the list of countries that can benefit, can be 
changed from time to time by the President. 
(13) Voluntary Restraint Agreements: (e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 352, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1982 (1982), Agricultural Act of 1956 § 204, 7 U.S.C. § 18S4 and others): Occasionally gov-
ernments that are exporting to the United States will be willing "voluntarily" to restrain the 
-level of those exports. In general, U.S. law prevents the U.S. government from entering into 
agreements about this (the exceptions are textiles and agricultural goods), but sometimes for-
eign governments will restrain themselves without an explicit agreement with the U.S. govern-
ment, although generally with a favorable nod from the U.S. government. 
(14) General Customs Tariffs (Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 516, 19 U.S,G, subtitle I 
(1982)): The United States, like other countries, has a general customs tariff law that requires 
an entry form to be made for each import. The tariff charge varies from item to item, accord-
ing to an elaborate tariff schedule. Most tariffs have been reduced significantly under the 
various negotiating rounds of GATT. 
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APPENDIX B 
COST ESTIMATES OF U.S. IMPORT REGU:LATION 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
1. U.S. Government Costs - Estimates* Budget Annual 
Name of Agency 1982 1983 Estimate 
International Trade Commission 17.6 19.8. 20 
Intl. Trade Admin. (Commerce, 
Import reg.) 8.1 NIA 10 
Office of U.S. Trade Representative 9.2 10.5 11 
Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, Dept. 
State N/A 2.23 2.5 
· Annual Total 34.9 32.53 43.5 
2. Private Costs: Extra-Firm (Attys, Approx.*** 
etc.)** 
Type of Action No. per Yr. Total Cost 
il. 
Escape Clause (201-203) 9 $4.125 
Anti-dumping: New 50 $23.750 
AD - annual reviews 109 $13.625 
Countervailing Duty - New 40 $16.300 
CV - annual reviews 81 $10.125 
Section 337 40 $28.000 
Section 301 6 $1.050 
TOTAL 335 $96.975 
3. Private Costs: Intra-Firm $96.975 
(Guess based on extra-firm costs) 
4. OVERALL TOTAL ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF COSTS $237.450 
TOTAL VALUE OF IMPORTS - 1983 ($ Billion) 254 
COSTS AS A PERCENT OF IMPORTS 0.0935% 
COSTS AS A FRACTION OF IMPORTS 0.000935 
NOTES: * Amounts are overstated since little attempt has been made to disaggregate for 
various functions within a unit. On the other hand, as explained in the text, 
agencies with a very small amount of activities in this area are omitted. 
** Estimates of total costs are not simply a multiple of cases times average cost 
per case, but involve estimates of the number of cases which are appealed, go 
on for further procedures (injury test), etc. 
*** Based largely on 1983 filings, with averages of prior years used to estimate an 
annual number if 1983 figures seemed unrepresentative. 
